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UNITED STATES V SINGLETON: A
WARNING SHOT HEARD 'ROUND THE
CIRCUITS?
To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right of justice.
—Magna Carta, Clause 40
INTRODUCTION
King John's reluctant concession to this principle led to the sign-
ing of the Magna Carta in 1215 and marked one of the earliest foun-
dations of Anglo-American jurisprudence.' Although this concept has
been significantly modified over the last seven centuries, the funda-
mental ideal that a government of laws exists to uphold justice, and
not merely to sell it to the highest bidder, continues to guide our
notions of fairness. 2 Skeptics suggest that the modern application of
this ideal, however, has much more strength as a rhetorical flourish
than as a judicially enforced principle. Pointing to such noteworthy
examples as the O.J. Simpson case and the JonBenet Ramsey investi-
gation, many modern skeptics question whether individuals with vast
financial resources can indeed buy justice.3 Some scholars go so as far
as to argue that prosecutors' reliance on the plea bargaining system,
where a defendant can "purchase" his freedom by testifying against a
co-defendant, has effectively resulted in the governmental business of
selling justice to the highest bidder.'
In 1998, in United States v. Singleton, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of purchased testimony. 5 In excluding
testimony from a witness who had agreed to testify against his co-de-
fendant in exchange for a prosecutorial promise of leniency, a three
judge panel concluded that this plea bargain violated a federal statute
governing bribery of witnesses. 6 Although the panel's decision was
See generally DANIEL R. Cocztittazt-rE, THE ANGLO—AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 60, 80-88
(1999).
2 See id.
3 See, e.g., Sherry Keene-Osborn & Daniel Glick, Who Really Killed fonBenet?, TIMES OF
LONDON, July 9, 1998; Diana Trilling, Notes on the Thal of the Century; How the O.J. Thal will be
Remembered, 18 NEW REPUBLIC, Oct 10, 1995.
4 See Richard J. Johnston, Paying the Witness: Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but Not the
Defense?, 12 CRIM. JUST. 21 (1997).
5 See 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en bane, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
6 See 144 F.3d at 1360-61 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2), the federal bribery statute).
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overturned when reheard en banc in January of 1999, many scholars
were intrigued that a respected federal court challenged the validity of
witness-bargained agreements.? Because plea bargaining has become
such an ingrained practice in our modern criminal justice system,
these scholars have closely examined the panel's rationale for exclud-
ing witness-bargained testimony. 8
The panel in Singleton reasoned that the prosecutor's agreement
with the witness was essentially a payment for testimony. 9 Even though
attorneys for the government argued that the federal bribery statute
was not applicable to the U.S. Attorney, the panel maintained that basic
democratic principles as articulated in the Magna Carta mandated the
statute's application to the government.° Although the Singleton deci-
sion was overturned and the panel's rationale was expressly rejected
when it was reheard en banc, the case is by no means final because
defense attorneys have petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari."
The prospect of the Supreme Court possibly re-examining the
rationales for plea bargaining has sent shock waves throughout the
legal community.° Criminal defense lawyers herald the original three
judge panel's logic in Singleton as landmark, with implications as far
reaching as the Miranda decision, because it seemed to signal the
beginning of the end of plea bargaining for testimony. 15 Larry Pozner,
president-elect of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
7 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle & David E. Rovella, Stunning Rulings Curtail Prosecutors' Power, NAT'L
L. J., July 20, 1998, at Al; David Dinell, Appeals Panel &yetis Witness Deals, WICHITA Bus. J., July
13, 1998; Paul Elias, Criminal Deals Are Placed in Limbo, THE RECORDER, July 9, 1998; Debra
Saunders, Singleton Motions, S. F. L. J., July 12, 1998, at 9.
8 See, e.g., id.
9 See 114 F.3d at 1348.
19 See id. at 1346-47. In fact, the panel quoted Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States noting,
Our Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example . . . ['Flo declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring
terrible retribution.
Id. at 1346 (quoting 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928)).
" See 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 165 U.S.L.W. 3772 (U.S.
June 21, 1999) (No. 98-8758).
I$ 	 supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding police must inform suspects of
their constitutional right to remain silent and right to an attorney before an interrogation may
proceed). Many scholars have noted that the Miranda decision fundamentally changed the way
in which law enforcement officials can proceed in both the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases. See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 458-62 (2d ed. 1995). In
equating Singleton to Miranda, some members of the legal community maintain that by excluding
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yers, commented on the panel's holding and said, "[t]he court has
ended decades of government-sanctioned bribery. A system in which
the government [can] exchange freedom for a story they wanted to
hear is a system rampant with injustice."14 Also commenting on the
panel's ruling, Singleton's attorney stated, "When the government
wraps the American flag around a . . . [witness], juries believe them,
because that witness is cloaked with the power and majesty of the
United States." 15 Singleton's attorney further added that the decision
could "completely change the plea bargaining system," and force pro-
secutors to work, "harder and cleaner." 16
While criminal defense attorneys praise the panel's rationale in
Singleton, prosecutors contend that this decision runs contrary to years
of precedent and are relieved that it was reversed en banc. 17 San Diego
Assistant United States Attorney and Criminal Division Head Bruce
Castetter noted, "the [panel] ruling [was] really, really, stupid. Have
you read it? Dumb."18 Other prosecutors have argued, "It's a horrible
ruling. It [would] hamstring us and . . . become a nightmare." 1° judge
Smalkin of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
even stated that, "[t]he chances of . . . the Supreme Court reaching
the same conclusion as the Singleton panel are . . . about the same as
discovering that the entire roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of
cleverly disguised leprechauns."2°
While plea bargaining was a major subject of debate in the aca-
demic literature of the 1970s and 1980s, the Singleton case has caused
many to examine the issue from a different perspective: namely, does
the system effectively amount to bribery?" In analyzing this question,
Sections I and II of this Note examine the early development of plea
bargaining in Anglo-American history as well as how the practice op-
erates in the modern criminal justice system. 22 Section III focuses on
the United States constitutional justifications for plea bargaining and
Section IV will address the academic debate surrounding the practice."
witness-bargained testimony, the court has forced law enforcement to use other investigative tools
in order to convict a defendant. See Dinell, supra note 7.
14 Coyle & Rovella, supra note 7, at Al.
15 Saunders, supra note 7, at 9.
16 Dinell, supra note 7.
17 See Coyle Rovella, supra note 7, at Al.
18 David Rovella & Gail Cox, Fallout from Singleton Bribe Ruling, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 24, 1998,
at Al.
19 Elias, supra note 7.
"United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521-22 (D. Md. 1998).
21 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343; see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 24.
22 See infra notes 27-69 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 70-141 and accompanying text.
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Sections V and VI provide a detailed analysis of both the three judge
panel's rationale in Singleton and the en banc decision that reversed
that opinion.24 Section VII assesses the legislative history of the federal
bribery statute on which the Singleton court based its decision and con-
cludes that this statute is inapplicable to federal prosecutors negotiat-
ing plea bargains. 25 Finally, Section VIII argues that the policy justifica-
tions for plea bargaining are weak in the context of witness-bargained
agreements and the Singleton case could, therefore, be viewed as a
Varning shot" to prosecutors who over-rely on plea bargaining as a
tool for gaining testimony. 26
I. PLEA BARGAIN TERMINOLOGY AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Plea bargaining is defined as "[t] he process whereby the accused
and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval."27 In general, there
are several methods by which plea bargaining operates in modern
practice. 28 The first is implicit plea bargaining, where the defendant,
without the impetus of negotiations with the prosecutor, pleads guilty
to a certain, usually lesser, offense. 28 Scholars suggest that many defen-
dants enter guilty pleas because they implicitly believe that this will
result in a lesser sentence. 30 The second, and most common plea
bargaining method operates through formal discussions with a prose-
cutor and can be divided into two sub-categories.s' The first occurs
when a defendant enters negotiations to plead guilty to a certain lesser
offense in exchange for a reduced sentence. 32 The second type involves
a prosecutor promising something, usually leniency or a promise not
to bring the accused up on any charges, in exchange for the person's
valuable testimony implicating a defendant in another case. 33 The
focus of this Note is on the latter type of plea bargaining—promises
made by a prosecutor in exchange for testimony.
24 See infra notes 142-258 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 265-353 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 265-353 and accompanying text.
27 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (6th ed. 1990).
"See generally WAYNE LA FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 766 (1985)
(discussing the mechanics of modern day plea bargaining).
29 See
" See id.
31 See id.
ss see ict .
33 See WAYNE LA FAVE ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1083 (4th ed. 1974).
July 1999)
	
PLEA BARGAINING	 901
The plea bargaining process is regulated by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the fed-
eral immunity statutes. 34 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)
allows attorneys for the government and for the defendant to enter
into negotiations in which the prosecutor can offer the following: (1)
a move for dismissal of charges; (2) a recommendation, or agreement
not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence; or (3)
an agreement that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of
the case." Rule 11(e), however, explicitly precludes the court from
being involved in these negotiations, thus leaving the process solely in
the hands of the prosecution and the defense. 36
In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, enacted in 1984,
include provisions that impact plea bargaining. 37 Section 3E1.1 allows
for a reduction in sentence if the defendant "clearly demonstrates
acceptance or responsibility for his offense."° 8 The commentary to the
rule lists several alternatives by which a defendant can manifest this ac-
ceptance, including truthfully admitting to conduct (pleading guilty)."
Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allows for a reduc-
tion in sentence if the defendant offers substantial assistance to the
authorities 40 The Sentencing Commission has noted that a defendant's
assistance in the resolution of other criminal investigations should
mitigate the severity of the sentence imposed because this kind of
assistance helps resolve criminal cases 9 1
The federal immunity statutes also regulate the plea bargaining
process.42 Under these series of statutes enacted as a part of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970, courts are authorized to confer
immunity (freedom from criminal prosecution) upon government wit-
nesses in criminal trials.43 In upholding the validity of these immunity
34 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994);
28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994). The Federal Rules of Evidence also govern
aspects of the plea bargaining process. Rule 410 prohibits evidence concerning a defendant's
willingness or actual participation in plea negotiations to be admitted to prove a defendant's
guilt See FED. R. EVIL/. 410. The advisory committee noted that exclusion of this evidence permits
"unrestrained candor" and allows for prompt disposition of cases. See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory
committee's note.
33 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e) (1) (a)-(c).
" See id.
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
" U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1997).
" See id.
40 See id. § 5K1.1.
41 See id. § 5K1.1 sentencing commission's comments.
42 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994).
43 See 18 U.S.C. § 6003.
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statutes, the Supreme Court has concluded that granting immunity for
witnesses "reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many
offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving
useful testimony are those implicated in the crime."44 The Supreme
Court also determined that these immunity statutes are essential to the
effective enforcement of various criminal statutes, and are "so familiar
that they have become part of our 'constitutional fabric.'" 45
IL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PLEA BARGAINING
Although the debate surrounding plea bargaining has intensified
within the last thirty years, it is certainly not a new controversy. Even
its historical origins are the subject of much debate.° Some scholars
trace its development to tribal society where individuals exacted re-
venge, however they saw fit, against those who had wronged them. 47
The plea bargaining concept developed from this human instinct for
revenge.° Over time, wronged parties began to accept some sort of
payment, usually money, instead of seeking physical revenge 49 As An-
glo-Saxon society developed even further, local communities drafted
lists of compromises. 5° Private parties could look at these lists to deter-
mine the adequate compensation for their injury. 31 With the ascension
of William the Conqueror in 1066, the state became involved in this
previously private bargaining system through a concept known as the
"King's Peace. "52 Using this rationale to expand his power over local
feudal territories, the King began to legislate on matters that previously
had been enforced privately, including the prosecution of "breaches
of the peace," and the imposition of penalties. 33 As more and more
cases were brought as "breaches of the King's peace," the practice of
bargaining for punishment became a popular tool for courts. 54
44 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1976) (upholding validity of federal hrununity
statutes).
48 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1976) (upholding validity of federal
immunity statutes).
46 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 L. & Soc'sr REV. 211, 212
(1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History); Jay Wishingrad, Note, Plea Bargaining in
Historical Perspective, 23 Bunt. L. REV. 499, 500 (1973-74).
47 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 500. For an excellent description of this historical period
see Cow/ELLE-1-TE, supra note 1, at 37-42, 55-62.
43 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 501.
49 See id.
" See id. at 504.
51 See id
52 See id. at 505-06.
33 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 50546.
54 See id. at 509, 511.
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This historical interpretation of the plea bargaining system has
been criticized. 55 Most of its opponents contend that plea bargaining
is essentially a modern invention that became a popular method of
case management during the 1920s. 56 In dismissing the idea that plea
bargaining dates back to the eleventh century, critics point to such
credible evidence as Sir Matthew Hale's treatise, Pleas of the Crown, to
show that as late as 1670 "it [was] usual for the judge to discourage an
accused from pleading guilty, and to advise the party to plead [not
guilty] and put himself upon his trial."57 Most scholars contend that
plea bargaining did not reach the United States until after the Civil
War.° These scholars note that as late as 1874 the United States Su-
preme Court condemned plea bargaining, when the Court stated that
"[a] man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial
rights. "36
Despite this judicial rebuke of plea bargaining, many urban juris-
dictions employed the practice at the turn of the century.° In an era
when corruption dominated urban politics and law enforcement, it was
a common practice for prosecutors to sell lesser sentences for a fee fit
It was not until the 1920s, when cities began to officially survey their
criminal justice systems, that these corrupt bargaining practices were
exposed. 62 At this time, it was not uncommon for city prosecutors to
resolve over seventy percent of their cases by defendants entering guilty
pleas (a strong indication that prosecutors were bargaining for guilty
pleas) .65
The reliance on plea bargaining remained steady throughout the
early part of the twentieth century and then increased dramatically
53 See, e.g., Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 212; John H. Langbein,
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'v Rxv. 261 (1979) [hereinafter
Langbein, Short History).
56 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 228-29.
57 Langbein, Short History, supra note 55, at 264-65.
38 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 221-23.
59 Id. at 227 (quoting Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874)). The Supreme Court
also explicitly rejected agreements where co-defendants agreed to testify in order to be charged
with lesser crimes. See generally Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878). In the Whiskey Cases, the Court
held that although agreements which resulted in full pardons were permissible, bargains that
"led to a reduction in punishment and an abandonment of the government's claims w[ere}
invalid." See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 226 (interpreting the Whiskey
Cases).
60 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 229.
61 See id. at 229, 233.
" See id. at 229.
65 See id.
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again in the 1960s. 24 Today, it is estimated that ninety percent of all
criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargaining .° Most scholars
attribute the increase in plea bargaining to the "due process" revolu-
tion of the 1960s. 66 As the Warren Court afforded defendants more
constitutional rights in state courts, prosecutors found it more difficult
to convict. 67 This difficulty in attaining convictions, combined with an
overall caseload increase due to the criminalization of more activities,
resulted in crowded dockets. 68 Thus, in the latter half of this century,
prosecutors have relied on plea bargaining simply to manage the
overwhelming number of cases on their dockets.°
III. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL OF THE PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of plea bargaining in several landmark cases during the 1970s. 70 There
have been two general categories of constitutional arguments sur-
rounding plea bargaining. The first revolve around the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which states, "[On all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." 71 Advocates who rely on this language
maintain that plea discussions deny the accused the opportunity to be
judged by a jury of his peers. This argument has been largely unsuc-
cessful, however, because the Supreme Court has maintained that as
long as the defendant enters his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intel-
ligently, his Sixth Amendment rights have not been violated. 72
The second set of constitutional criticisms of plea bargaining
revolve around the Fifth Amendment which provides that "[n] o person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law . . . ."73 Proponents of this argument maintain that entering a
" See Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context 13 L & SOG'Y REV.
273, 273 (1979).
66 See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
66 See, e.g., Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 238-39; Lawrence M. Fried-
man, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 247, 256-58 (1979).
67 See, e.g., Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 238-39.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 239; see also Friedman, supra note 66, at 248.
"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971); Alford v. United States, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) .
71 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72 See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62; Boykin v. Alabama, 396 U.S. 238, 242 (1969);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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guilty plea to receive some benefit from the state (namely leniency, a
reduced charge or sentence reduction) amounts to coercion. It, there-
fore, violates the protection against self-incrimination. 74 The Court
addressed this Fifth Amendment argument in 1970, in Brady v. United
States. 75
In Brady, the Supreme Court of .the United States upheld the
validity of a defendant's guilty plea even though the defendant's desire
to avoid the death penalty motivated the plea. 76 Brady, the defendant,
was charged with kidnapping in violation of the Federal Lindbergh Act
and faced a possible death sentence." When Brady learned that his
co-defendant had entered into an agreement with the government to
testify against him, he changed his plea to guilty. 7' Brady subsequently
appealed, arguing that his guilty plea was not voluntary because it was
motivated by both his fear that he would be sentenced to death and
his desire for a reduced sentence. 79 In upholding the validity of his
guilty plea, the Court reasoned that a guilty plea is not necessarily
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever it is motivated by a
desire to accept a lesser penalty rather than risk the chances of a higher
penalty at trial."
The Court discussed the mutual benefits of the plea bargaining
system, stating that
for a defendant . . . the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his exposure is
reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately,
and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the
State there are also advantages—the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively
attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance
of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are con-
served for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of
the defendant's guilt or in which there is a substantial doubt
that the State can sustain its burden of proof.si
74 See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 357, 360; Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-39; Brady, 397 U.S. at
758.
78 See 397 U.S. at 758.
76 See id.
77 The Lindbergh Act allowed for a defendant to be punished by death if the victim of the
kidnapping was not "liberated without harm." See id. at 743.
78 See id.
78 See id. at 744.
" See 397 U.S. at 751.
61 Id. at 752.
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In light of these mutual benefits, the Court held that plea bargain-
ing was constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, as long as the
defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and vol-
untarily.82 Recognizing that defendants receive numerous advan-
tages by pleading guilty, the Court held that a defendant's desire to
get a lesser penalty or sentence does not, in and of itself, make his
guilty plea involuntary."
One year after Brady, in Santobello v. New York, the Supreme Court
again addressed the validity of plea bargaining." In Santobello, the
Court held that a defendant who completes a plea agreement with the
prosecution can claim specific performance of that agreement if it is
not honored." The defendant in Santobello was indicted on two counts
of felony gambling and initially entered a plea agreement where he
would plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for the prosecutor's
promise not to make a sentence recommendation." When Santobello
changed his counsel and learned that the evidence against him was
possibly the product of an illegal search, he motioned to withdraw his
plea." The court denied this motion and proceeded to the sentencing
phase where a new prosecutor, apparently unaware of the previous plea
agreement, made a sentence recommendation of one year—the statu-
tory maximum." Despite the defense's objection, Santobello was sen-
tenced to one year in prison," The case was remanded to the lower
court to determine whether the prosecutor's violation of the prior
agreement influenced the judge's decision."
The Supreme Court upheld the initial agreement, reasoning that
plea bargaining was both an essential and desirable part of the criminal
process." The Court listed the benefits of plea bargaining, noting that
it leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most crimi-
nal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pre-trial confinement for those accused per-
sons who are denied release pending trial; it protects the
82 See id. at 758.
83 See Li
"See 404 U.S. 257.
88 See id. at 263.
8° See id. at 258.
87 See id. at 258-59.
88 See id. at 259.
89 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259. The judge noted that the prosecution's recommendation did
not influence his decision. See id. at 259-60.
9° See id. at 262-63.
9 ' See id. at 261.
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public from those who are prone to continue criminal con-
duct even while on pre-trial release; and, by shortening the
time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they
are ultimately imprisoned. 92
Thus, since the Court in Santobello thought that plea bargaining was
such an essential component of the American criminal justice sys-
tem, it held that defendants can claim specific performance of plea
agreements offered by prosecutors. 95
The Court examined the constitutionality of plea bargaining again
in 1978, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 94 In Bordenkircher, the Court held that
a prosecutor could charge a defendant with additional crimes once
plea negotiations broke down, because the power to negotiate bargains
is solely within the prosecutor's discretion. 95 In Bordenkircher, the prose-
cutor offered the defendant a reduced sentence if he pleaded guilty
on a charge of uttering a forged instrument (writing false checks)."
The prosecutor said, however, that if the defendant did not plead
guilty, he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual
Criminal Act that had a mandatory life sentence.97 The defendant
refused to accept the prosecutor's offer, was found guilty, and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. 98
On appeal, the defendant contended that the prosecutor's charge
based on the Kentucky Habitual Offender Act was a vindictive action
that violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights." The Supreme
Court upheld the conviction and reasoned that the defendant had the
same bargaining power as the state.'" The Court stated that there was
no element of punishment or retaliation on the part of the prosecu-
tion because in the "give and take" of plea bargaining the accused is
free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. 191 The Court further
added,
92 Id.
93 See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63.
94 See 434 U.S. 357.
" See id. at 363-65.
"See id. at 358.
97 See id.
93 See id. at 358-59.
" See Bonlenkireher, 434 U.S. at 359-60.
100 See id. at 363-65.
1 ° 1 See id. at 363.
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a rigid constitutional rule that would prohibit a prosecutor
from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the defense could
only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice
of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has
so recently emerged. 1 Q2
Thus, the Bordenkircher Court held that it was not a due process
violation for the prosecution to file additional charges against the
defendant once plea negotiations broke down.m Commentators
maintain that the Bordenkircher decision provides the prosecution
with broad discretion in plea bargaining.m Specifically, the com-
mentators note that although the Court could have required lower
courts to be more intimately involved in the plea negotiation system,
"[t]he Bordenkircher Court made it clear that the role of the prose-
cutor was preeminent in the criminal justice system:" 5
IV. THE ACADEMIC DEBATe6
The most frequently cited reason for maintaining the plea bar-
gaining system is judicial efficiency. 107 Without this method of case
disposal, it is widely believed that courts could never address all the
cases before them. 108 Scholars contend that if plea bargaining were to
be prohibited, courts throughout the nation would be forced to sig-
nificantly enhance their infrastructure (both in terms of staffing and
physical plant) resulting in astronomical costs to taxpayers.mg Propo-
nents of plea bargaining also contend that it allows both prosecutors
102 Id. at 365.
103 See id. at 363-65.
104 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, J. CRIM. L CRIMINOLOGY 717,
754 (1996).
1°5 Id.
106 Most of the debate concerning plea bargaining has centered around bargains where the
defendant directly pleads guilty to a lesser sentence. Little if any of the literature has discussed
plea bargaining within the context of inducing witness testimony. In theory, however, the two
practices operate in a very similar manner. In both instances the prosecution attempts to reduce
its case load through the use of bargaining and the defendant/witness gives away the right to
trial in lieu of a reduced sentence or charge. Therefore, the literature is applicable to the type
of plea bargaining discussed in this Note.
107 Numerous scholars have advanced this argument. For an interesting study of this judicial
efficiency rationale, see MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 114 (1978); see also Peter Arenella,
Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without
Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463,524 (1980); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea
Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439,440 (1971).
im See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 107, at 524; HEUMANN, supra note 107, at 114-17; White,
supra note 107, at 440.
109 Former ChiefJustice Burger has argued that "a reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent
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and defendants to save their judicial resources for more serious dis-
putes."° These proponents argue that by weeding out cases early on,
courts can spend more time on those cases that require more extensive
debate."'
Many advocates also contend that defendants receive significant
benefits and protections from the plea bargaining system."' First, de-
fendants are able to avoid the cumbersome burden and public spot-
light that modern trials entail.'" Defendants, by entering a plea, avoid
the uncertainties and rigors associated with cross examination and
leaving their fate to twelve unknown jurors." 4 Secondly, plea bargain-
ing enables defendants to avoid the excessive punishments that legis-
latures have assigned to crimes through the Sentencing Guidelines."'
This practice of plea bargaining allows prosecutors to charge defen-
dants with lesser crimes and thus tailor the sentence to the offender
by manipulating the charges brought.'"
Plea bargaining advocates also contend that there are substantial
safety mechanisms in plea bargaining that ensure that the defendant
does not receive unfair deals.'" Among the most powerful of these
mechanisms is the "market for bargains."' If the prosecution offers
an unfair bargain, the defendant always has the option of going to trial
to get a "better deal."'" If, however, the prosecutor offers a "good deal,"
the defendant need not go to tria1. 120
Proponents of plea bargaining also maintain that the system is
inevitable.' 2 ' These scholars point to the concept of implicit plea bar-
in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities—judges, court
reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms." Burger, supra note 65, at 931.
no For a general discussion, see Arenella, supra note 107, at 524; HEUMANN, supra note 107,
at 114-17; White, supra note 107, at 440.
1 it see a
112 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at
261.
115 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Borclenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at
261.
"4 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at
261.
115 See HEUMANN, supra note 107, at 161.
is see id.
117 See generally Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL S-run.
289 (1985); DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION
203-05 (1984).
115 See Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 297-98.
119 See id.; see generally RICHARD P. ADELSTEIN, THE NEGOTIATED GUILTY PLEA: AN ECONOMIC
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1984).
125 See Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 297-98; see generally ADELSTEIN, supra note 119.
For a general discussion, see HEUMANN, supra note 107, at 157-62.
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gaining where a defendant enters a guilty plea without participating in
formal negotiations with the prosecution. Recognizing that many de-
fendants enter guilty pleas implicitly believing they will receive a re-
duced sentence, proponents maintain that even if formal plea nego-
tiations are abolished, bargaining would still occur.' 22
Despite all of the positive attributes of plea bargaining, the vast
majority of academics criticize the practice as it currently operates. 123
Perhaps the most cited criticism is that plea bargaining coerces defen-
dants and denies them their Fifth Amendment rights. 124 Much of this
criticism centers around the belief that innocent defendants will be
forced to enter guilty pleas out of fear that they will be punished if
they pursue their right to tria1. 12' These critics also maintain that guilty
defendants benefit from the plea bargaining system.' 26 Rather than face
trial, these defendants plead guilty to lesser charges than they would
otherwise have been charged with and thus receive excessive and
undeserved leniency. 127
Opponents also maintain that plea bargaining hinders respect for
the justice system. 128 When legal defenses are turned into bargaining
chips and guilty defendants are encouraged to accept lesser charges,
in See id.; see generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1037 (1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Inevitable]. In addition to these arguments, advocates also
maintain that the United States is not the only country that employs a plea bargaining system.
These proponents point to several European nations that employ a very similar practice. See
generally John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiations in England,
13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 287 (1979); William F. Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 309 (1979).
123 The scholars criticizing plea bargaining are numerous. For a sampling of some of the
more notable critics, see Albert Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV.
652 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, Changing Debate]; Albert Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role
in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role]; Albert
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Dial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining
System, 50 U. CHI. L REV. 931 (1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, Alternatives]; Albert Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L REV. 50 (1968) [hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecu-
tor's Role]; Douglas G. Gilford, Meaningful Reform in Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL L REV. 37 (1983); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U.
Cm. L. REV. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Torture]; Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE 14. 1979 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Disaster]; Schulhofer, Inevitable, supra
note 122.
124 See, e.g., Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea,
13 L. & Soc'v Rev. 527 (1979).
125 See id.
126 See, e.g., Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123, at 652-80; Gilford, supra note 123,
at 65-68.
121 See, e.g., Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123, at 652-80; Gilford, supra note 123,
at 65-68.
1128 See, e.g., ARTHUR ROSETTE & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS
IN THE AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 175-80 (1976).
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it is inevitable that there will be a loss of respect for the judicial
system.'s° In the sense that the court is an "omnipresent teacher" of
American democracy, critics argue that plea bargaining teaches defen-
dants to lie early on to receive lesser punishment's° As a result, both
innocent defendants and victims of crimes feel as if the system has
failed them."'
Another criticism of current plea bargaining practices is that too
much discretion is placed in the hands of the prosecutor in deciding
the fate of individual defendants. 13" In plea bargaining, two distinct
procedural processes are combined into one decision.'" Prosecutors
decide not only what the defendant will be found guilty of, but also
what sentence will be imposed, without judicial involvement.' 34 When
all of this power is placed within the hands of one individual, critics
maintain that the potential for prejudice and unequal treatment in-
creases exponentially."' In this sense, the trial process is good, in and
of itself, as it allows two distinct procedures with judicial, and perhaps
jury, involvement to ensure that a defendant's rights have not been
violated.'" Opponents of plea bargaining also argue that the privacy
of plea negotiations allows for collusion and corruption by prosecutors
with improper motives.' 37 Unlike most judges, prosecutors are not
motivated by finding what is a just outcome in a given case, but rather
in most instances by attaining a winning record and appearing tough
on crime. 138
The ad hoc nature of plea bargaining has also been the subject of
criticisms.'" Because there are no official guidelines governing how
129 see id,
1" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458 (1928); see also ROSETTE & CRESSEY, supra
note 128, at 175-80.
131 See RosETTE & CRESSEY, supra note 128, at 175-80.
I" See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
1 " See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
134 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
133 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
136 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
131 See, e.g., Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123, at 50; Gilford, supra note 123, at
65-68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
136 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65-68;
Misner, supra note 104, at 717.
139 See, e.g., Misner, supra note 104, at 718.
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and what prosecutors offer in their plea agreements, the predictability
and regularity of knowing the punishment a defendant will receive for
a specific crime is eliminated.' 49 Recognizing these and many other
inherent defects in the modern practice of plea bargaining, scholars
have advocated a variety of alternatives, ranging from the complete
abolishment of plea bargaining to simple additions including more
judicial involvement in the process.'41
V. UNITED STATES V. SINGLETON
In the shadow of the Supreme Court's constitutional approval of
plea bargaining and the intensive academic debate surrounding the
topic, in June of 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decided United States v. Singleton. 142 In Singleton, a three judge
panel held that a prosecutor's plea bargain with a witness that provided
leniency in exchange for his testimony against a co-defendant violated
a federal statute governing bribery of witnesses.' 49 Sonya Singleton, a
pregnant twenty-four year-old African American woman, was one of
several defendants convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine.'" The charges arose out of an investigation by the
Wichita Police who were suspicious of a number of Western Union wire
transfers.'45 The police soon discovered that these transfers were linked
to men who were suspected of drug trafficking. 146
Singleton was identified as one of several women who had either
sent or received wire transfers on behalf of the drug business.' 47 This
case centered on Singleton's motion to suppress the testimony of a
witness, Napoleon Douglas, during trial. 148 Douglas was a fellow defen-
dant, with an extensive criminal record, who had entered a plea agree-
ment with the Assistant United States Attorney.' 49 This agreement con-
tained three promises from the government.' 5° The prosecution first
promised not to indict Douglas for any violations of the Drug Abuse
140 See, e.g., id.
141 See generally Alschuler, Alternatives, supra note 123; Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note
123, at 50; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner, supra note 104.
142 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en bane, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999).
143 See id. at 1360-61.
144 Id. at 1343; see also Saunders, supra note 7, at 9.
143 See 144 F.3d at 1343.
146 See id.
141 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343-44.
148 See id. at 1344.
149 See
150 See id.
July 1999]
	
PLEA BARGAINING	 913
Prevention and Control Act."' The prosecution next promised "to
advise the sentencing court, prior to sentencing, of the nature and
extent of the cooperation provided" by Douglas in accordance with
U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 5K1.1.'" The court noted that Douglas
believed this would result in a lesser sentence than one he might
otherwise receive at trial.'" Finally, the prosecution promised to advise
the Mississippi parole board of the assistance Douglas provided." 4 In
exchange for these promises, Douglas agreed to "testify truthfully in
federal and/or state court" against the other defendants including
Single ton. 155
The trial court denied Singleton's motion to suppress Douglas'
testimony.' 56 She was subsequently convicted and sentenced to forty-six
months in prison followed by three years of probation. 157 Singleton
appealed this conviction alleging that the trial court erred in not
granting her motion to suppress Douglas' testimony.'"
A. Statutory Basis for the Exclusion of Testimony
Contrary to previous defendants who had attempted to suppress
co-conspirator plea bargained testimony based on the Fifth Amend-
ment, Singleton's argument was that the government's agreement with
Douglas was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2), a federal bribery
statute.'" Thus, the Singleton panel first assessed the statutory plain
language of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c), which states that
whoever, . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises
anything of value to any person, for or because of the testi-
mony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such
person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
before any court . . shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned for not more than two years, or both.'"
15I see id.
159 Singleton, 144 F.34 at 1344.
153 See id. at 1350-51.
154 See id. at 1344.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 1343.
1 " See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343.
159 See id.
159 See id. Ms. Singleton's argument seems to be based in large part on an article by a former
government prosecutor. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 21.
154 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) (1994).
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The court analyzed each portion of the statute recognizing that
Congress specifically intended that "§ 201 is to be broadly con-
strued to further its legislative purpose of deterring corruption. N61
The court first examined the class of persons to whom the statute
applies. 162 Noting the use of the word "whoever," the court analyzed
whether the U.S. Attorney, who was acting for the government, fit
within this definition.' 6' The U.S. Attorney cited Nardone v. United
States, where the United States Supreme Court decided that the gov-
ernment is presumptively exempted from complying with a statute in
two instances.u4 These two instances are: (1) when the statute would
deny the sovereign an established prerogative tide or interest (i.e. the
right to prosecute criminals), and (2) when the statute, as applied,
would create an absurdity for government actors (i.e. applying speed
limit laws to a police officer pursuing a suspect.)' 66
The Singleton court determined that the first exemption, inherent
government prerogative, did not apply because in Singleton "the opera-
tion of law is upon agents or servants of the government rather than
on the sovereign itself." 166 The Singleton court reasoned that 18 U.S.C.
201(c) (2) was enacted to prevent bribery and fraud and was applied
161 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345.
162 See a
'63 See id. at 1345-48.
'm See id. at 1345. In 1937, in Nardone Lt United States, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a federal statute governing the interception of wire communications was appli-
cable to federal agents who used wire taps to listen to the phone conversations of suspected
bootleggers. See 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). In Nardone, the defendants were charged with the
smuggling and concealment of alcohol in violation of the Volstad Act. See id. at 380. At trial,
federal agents testified to conversations they had overheard through tapping of the defendants'
telephones. See id. In appealing their subsequent conviction, the defendants argued that the
agents' testimony should have been excluded because it was obtained illegally in violation of
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. See id. at 380-81. This statute stated: "no person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communica-
tion to any person." Id. at 381. In deciding whether this statute was applicable to the government,
the Court determined that there are two instances when a statute does not apply to government:
(1) when the statute would deny the government a recognized or established title or interest;
and (2) where the application to the government would be an obvious absurdity. See id. at 383-84.
The Court held that in deciding whether applying a statute to the government denies an
established right or acts as an absurdity is a question "of policy." See id. at 383. The Court went
to great lengths to discuss the "moral" debate surrounding the general application of legislation,
specifically prohibition of wiretapping, to government actors and noted that it is the "view of
many that the practice [wiretapping] involves a grave wrong." Id. at 384. In applying these policy
arguments, the Nardone Court determined the wiretapping statute to be applicable to the gov-
ernment, stating that "the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to prevent
injury and wrong." Id.
'65 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1345-46.
166 /d. at 1346.
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not to the government as an entity but rather to a government agent,
namely the U.S. Attorney.'67 Since the statute applied merely to a
government agent, and not the government itself, the first Nardone
exemption was inapplicable. 168
The court further reasoned that under the first Nardone exemp-
tion (government prerogative), there are two requirements. 169 The first
requirement is that the statute is being applied to the government.'"
Once it is established that the statute is applied to the government, the
second requirement is that the statue would deny the government an
established right or prerogative. 171 In this case, since the U.S. Attorney
was merely an agent and not the government, the initial requirement
of the first Nardone exemption was not met.t 72
The judges in the panel, in a dissent to the en banc appeal, also
stated that the second requirement of the Nardone government pre-
rogative exemption was not met. The judges stated that since the stat-
ute applied merely to an agent of the United States, the government
retained its power to prosecute criminals (its governmental preroga-
tive). 175 The judges reasoned that applying § 201(c) (2) would merely
limit the manner by which the U.S. government's agent, the U.S.
Attorney, could exercise the established governmental prerogative to
prosecute criminals. 174
The Singleton panel also held that Nardone's second category of
government exemption, the absurdity exemption, was inapplicable. 175
In reviewing the concept of a limited sovereign from the Magna Carta
to present day, the court determined that § 201(c) (2) 's anti-corruption
policy has long been enforced by the common law. 176 In articulating
the policy of judicial integrity, the court stated,
[t] he judicial process is tainted and justice is cheapened when
factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or
money. Because prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to
167 See id
1" See id.
169 See id.
170 See Singleton, 144 F.Sd at 1346.
In see id.
t72 See
173 The Singleton three-judge panel did not specifically address this requirement. The dissent
in the Singleton en banc appeal, however, which consisted of the same three judges that were on
the original panel, did make this point. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1310-12
(10th Cir. 1999) (rehearing en banc).
174 see id.
175 See Singleton, 144 F.Sd at 1346-48.
176 See id. at 1346-47; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
916	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 40:897
do justice and observe the law in the course of a prosecu-
tion, it is particularly appropriate to apply the strictures of
§ 201(c) (2) to their activities.'"
The Singleton panel thus concluded that applying § 201(c) (2) to
government officials is far from absurd—rather, it is an essential
component of the Anglo-American legal tradition."8
After the court held that the statute applied to the U.S. Attorney,
it next determined whether the promises made to Douglas were, as the
statute requires, "for or because or his testimony.' 8 The court noted
that this requirement does not mandate a quid pro quo relationship,
but rather that the promises motivate the testimony. 18° The three judge
panel found that, because the promises and testimony mutually in-
duced each other in this case, the statute's requirement was met's'
Finally, the panel examined the statutory requirement that the gift
or promise be "something of value.”' 82 It noted that objects of value
are not restricted to things of monetary, commercial, objective or
tangible value.' 83 The court further articulated that the test of value is
whether the person receiving the object subjectively attaches value to
it.'84 In determining that Douglas valued the U.S. Attorney's promises,
the court said that the promise not to prosecute was of great value to
him: "besides guaranteed physical freedom, he was guaranteed free-
dom from the burden of defending himself and from the stigma of
prosecution and conviction." Thus, the statutory requirement that
the witness subjectively value the promise was met.
B. The Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)
In quoting the House Report on § 201, the Singleton panel main-
tained that the "legislative history confirms Congress's purpose that
giving or receiving anything of value by witnesses 'for' or 'because of'
. . . testimony . . . should be prohibited." The panel noted that the
majority of the debate concerning the bill was centered around new
conflicts of interest provisions regulating government employees, in-
1" Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1347-48.
1" See id.
09 Id. at 1348.
180 See id.
181 See id,
182 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1348-49.
las See id. at 1349.
184 See id.
188 Id. at 1350.
188 Id. at 1352 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 16 (1961)).
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eluding attorneys, and their private non-official actions.' 87 The Single-
ton panel also noted that most statements concerning the bill related
to the general topic of government corruption and not specifically to
the inducement of testimony in criminal trials.'"
Despite the general nature of the debate surrounding the statute,
the panel stated that the legislative history also confirms the Senate's
intent to hold the government to high ethical standards in its increas-
ingly complicated realm of activities. 189 In specifically addressing
§ 201(h) [now (c) (2)1, the panel pointed to the Congressional Record
which states that the amendments were not intended to "restrict the
broad scope of the present bribery statutes as construed by the
courts."'" Furthermore, the panel acknowledged that the House rec-
ognized that the exchange of testimony for something of value has "the
appearance of evil and the capacity of serving as a cover for evil." 191
Relying on both the policy of the general anti-corruption bill, as well
as the specific language concerning the broad scope of the bribery
provisions, the Singleton panel determined that its holding was consis-
tent with Congress's express legislative intent.' 92
The panel also examined the manner in which Congress struc-
tured § 201. 199 It noted that Congress specifically divided the legislation
into two provisions: bribery prohibitions and gratuity prohibitions. 194
In examining this structure, the panel concluded that § 201(c) (2) is
included under gratuity prohibitions and therefore does not require a
corrupt intent to influence.'" Thus, the Singleton panel stated that the
promise of leniency to Douglas did not have to be based upon any
corrupt intent of the prosecutor to influence testimony.196 Rather, it
was enough that the prosecutor made the promise of leniency and that
Douglas subjectively valued it. 197
181 See S. REP. No. 2213, at 1 (1962), re/irinted in 1962 U.S.C.C..A.N. 3852, 3852.
1" See id. at 3853.
189 See id.
190 M. The federal bribery statute was significantly altered to its present statutory language
in 1962 as part of a Congressional auempt to root out graft within the government. See id. at
3852-68. This provision was originally codified as 18 U.S.C. § 201(h) but a 1986 amendment,
which did not change any of the statutory language, re-codified the provision as 18 U.S.C.
§ 210 (c) (2).
191 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
192 see id,
198 See id. at 1351-52.
194 See id. at 1351.
195 see is
196 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1351.
197 See id.
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The panel also examined the language of the other § 201 provi-
sions.'" It stated that in sharp contrast to § 201(c) (2), § 201(c) (1)
expressly exempts the Executive Branch from its operation.' In re-
viewing the language of "whoever" in (c) (2), the panel noted that the
government exemption language is conspicuously absent, therefore
pointing to Congress's intent to apply the provision to government
actors. 20°
C. Law Enforcement Justifications for Exclusion
In addition to the previously discussed reasons, the panel also
raised an issue sua sponte: namely whether some overriding policy
should prevent application of this statute to the U.S. Attorney. For
example, criminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable
enforcement actions by officers of the law."' The court, however, re-
jected this argument because the promise of leniency was not made by
a police officer acting in exigent circumstances to prevent a ctime. 202
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "to] nce the exigen-
cies of field enforcement are satisfied, we can find no policy by which
prosecutors may be excused from statutes regulating testimony pre-
sented to the federal courts." 2"
D. Sentencing Guidelines
The court also discussed whether holding § 201(c) (2) applicable
to the government runs contrary to the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 2°4 Section 5K1.1 of these guidelines provides reduced sentences
to defendants who offer "substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 205 In
holding that § 201(c) (2) and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
not contradictory, the panel determined that substantial assistance
does not include testimony and that Congress enacted the sentencing
provisions recognizing the illegality of giving anything of value for
testimony. 2" In maintaining that its decision would not impede federal
198 See id. at 1350-51.
I" See id. at 1350.
200 See id.
201 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
892 See id. at 1353.
203 id.
204 See id. at 1354-55; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
205 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)).
206 See id. at 1355.
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prosecutions and defeat the purpose of § 5K1.1, the court stated that
"a defendant can substantially assist an investigation or prosecution in
myriad ways other than by testifying." 207 Although the panel maintained
that substantial assistance could include a variety of other actions
beyond merely testifying, it did not enumerate any other methods of
assistance.2"
After establishing these points, the Singleton panel held that the
federal bribery statute was applicable to the U.S. Attorney. 2® The court
reasoned that in promising the witness prosecutorial leniency in ex-
change for his testimony, the U.S. Attorney essentially bribed the wit-
ness and violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). 2 b0 Recognizing the impact that
this decision might have upon other criminal prosecutions, the panel
ordered that the appeal be reheard en banc, and that the opinion be
vacated until the full panel decision. 2"
VI. SINGLETON EN BANC DECISION
In January of 1999, with Judge Porfillo speaking for the majority,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the Single-
ton three judge panel's decision. 212 The en banc majority held that the
federal prosecutor's plea agreement with Douglas was not subject to
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). 213 Thus, the trial court properly denied Single-
ton's motion to suppress the testimony. 214
The majority first reasoned that under the first Nardone exemp-
tion, § 201(c) (2) denied the government an established prerogative. 215
The government, therefore, was presumptively exempt from adhering
to the statute. 216 The majority held that plea agreements between de-
fendants and the United States Attorney were really agreements be-
tween the defendant and the United States government (not an agent
of the government as the Singleton panel maintained) and thus met
"7 1d.
208 See id.
2°9 See id. at 1351.
210 See Singleton, 144 E3d at 1351. After reaching this conclusion, the court also determined
the witness agreement to be in violation of Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b). See id.
at 1358-59. This rule provides that "[a] lawyer shall not offer an inducement to a witness that
is prohibited by law." KANSAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b).
2 " See Singleton, 144 E3d at 1361-62.
2112 See United States v, Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (rehearing en banc).
213 see id,
214 see id.
215 See id. at 1301-02.
216 See id.
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the first requirement of the initial Nardone exemption.217 After estab-
lishing that the statute operated on the government, the court moved
to the second requirement and held that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) denied
the government of an established and long-standing right, namely the
ability to prosecute criminal cases. 218 Thus, because § 201(c) (2) both
applied to the government and denied an established right, U.S. At-
torneys were presumptively exempt from adhering to it when entering
plea agreements under the first Nardone exemption. 219
Additionally, the majority held that under the second Nardone
exemption, applying § 201(c) (2) to plea agreements would operate as
an absurdity.22° The court reasoned that providing leniency for testi-
mony is an established practice in American jurisprudence. 22 ' It stated
that 'we must presume if Congress had intended that section 201(c) (2)
overturn this ingrained aspect of American legal culture, it would have
done so in clear, unmistakable, and unarguable language."222 Thus, the
majority held that it would be absurd to apply this statute to the U.S.
Attorney because the statute did not specifically mandate application
to prosecutors entering plea agreements. 223 It would be counter-intui-
tive to apply such a general statute as § 201(c) (2) to these plea agree-
ments.224 The majority reasoned that if Congress had really intended
to overturn this long standing practice, it would have said so using
much clearer and specific language. 225
Furthermore, the majority stated that when § 201(c) (2) was en-
acted, Congress did not intend to limit prosecutors' ability to plea
211 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301. Reasoning that the government's sovereign authority to
prosecute is vested solely in the United States Attorney, the court concluded that a criminal case
can not even be heard unless a U.S. Attorney files a motion and begins prosecution. See id. The
majority opined that the , U.S. Attorney is the alter ego of the government and therefore "when
an assistant U.S. Attorney enters into a plea agreement with a defendant, that plea agreement is
between the United States government and the defendant." Id.
218 See id. at 1300-01.
2 19 see id,
220 See Singleton, l65 F.3d at 1301.
na See id. at 1301-02.
m Id. at 1302.
223 See id. at 1301-02.
224 see id,
225 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301-02. The court also cited several cases that held that applying
18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) would operate as an absurdity. See id. at 1301 (citing United States v. Reid,
19 F. Supp. 2d 534,535-38 (E.D. Va. 1998); United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-34
(S.D. Fla. 1998); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521,521-22 (D. Md. 1998)). The
court also noted that at least one district court has followed the Singleton panel's reasoning in
applying 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) to plea agreements. See id. at 1301 (citing United States v
Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352 No. CRIM. A. 96-0339 (ED. La. Aug. 27, 1998)).
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bargain. 226 The majority noted that the plain meaning of the term
"whoever" in the statute does not logically mean the U.S. govern-
ment.227 Quoting the Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
the majority held that the term "whoever" means "whatever person" or
"any person."228 Because the U.S. government is an inanimate object,
the majority reasoned that Congress purposefully excluded the govern-
ment from adherence to the statute. 22° The majority stated that if
Congress had intended the statute to apply to the government, the
term "whatever" would have been used. 25° Thus, applying § 201(c) (2)
to prosecutors entering plea agreements would run contrary to Con-
gress's intent.23 '
Finally, the majority held that it was unnecessary to address the
conflicts between § 201(c) (2) and other congressional enactments
such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 252 The court stated, "we
simply believe this particular statute (§ 201(c) (2)] does not exist for
the government. "233 Thus, by virtue of the Nardone test for government
exemption as well as Congress's intent to exempt prosecutors from
§ 201(c) (2), the court held that the practice of bargaining for testi-
mony was not subject to the federal bribery statute. 2'
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Henry and Judge Lucero
criticized the majority's reasoning. 235 Concurring in the judgement that
§ 201(c) (2) did not apply to prosecutors entering plea agreements,
Lucero and Henry maintained that the conflicts between § 201(c) (2)
and other statutes are "dispositive" in allowing prosecutors to enter
plea agreements.236 The concurring judges reasoned that subsequent
statutes, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal
immunity statutes, reveal a legislative intent to override § 201(c) (2)
and permit the practice of bargaining for testimony. 237
These concurring judges maintained, however, that the majority
misapplied the two Nardone exemptions in the Singleton case.238 Apply-
2" See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1300-01.
2" See id. at 1300 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2611 (1993)).
2" Id,
229 See id. at 1300-01.
"° See id. at 1300.
231 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1300-01.
232 See id. at 1302.
2" Id.
234 See id.
222 See id. at 1303-08.
2" See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1303.
237 See id
238 See id at 1304-05.
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ing the first Nardone exemption (government prerogative), the con-
currence maintained that this exemption only applied where "the
operation of the law is upon the sovereign itself rather than the agents
or servants of the government."2" The concurring judges thus dis-
agreed with the majority's holding that the U.S. Attorney was the
government and that § 201(c) (2) would deny the government a pre-
rogative. These judges reasoned that because § 201(c) (2) operated
merely on government agents and not the sovereign itself; the govern-
ment prerogative exemption was inapplicable. 24° Furthermore, the con-
curring judges determined that the second Nardone exemption (obvi-
ous absurdity) did not apply in Singleton. 241 They held that "the
majority's holding itself worked an obvious absurdity by implying that
a federal prosecutor who bribes a witness to supply false testimony is
not subject to the criminal prohibitions of § 201."242
Although the concurring judges stated that the majority misap-
plied the two Nardone exemptions, they maintained that prosecutors
entering plea agreements are nonetheless exempt from adhering to
§ 201(c) (2).242 In coming to this conclusion, these judges noted that it
is an elementary tenant of statutory construction that "where there is
no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled
or nullified by a general one. "244 Thus, they reasoned that subsequent
congressional provisions overruled the general prohibitions of
§ 201(c) (2).245 The concurrence pointed to specific statutes including
the federal immunity statutes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and noted,
these various statutes create both a substantive and proce-
dural framework for bargaining between government agents
and potential witnesses. . . . The result is a coherent, narrowly
defined set of laws that operate in the same field as the more
general prohibitions of § 201(c) (2) . . . [and therefore these
2" Id. at 1304.
240 See IS at 1304-05.
241 See Singleton, 165 F.3d 1304-05.
242 IS at 1304. In a separate concurring opinion, Chiefjudge Henry said that the application
of state codes of professional ethics, an issue not addressed by either the majority nor this Note,
is au issue of extreme importance. See id. at 1302-03. Noting recent federal legislation holding
federal prosecutors to state standards of professional conduct, judge Henry opined that the issue
raised in this case is "a problem that may arise again." Id.
243 See IS at 1305-08.
244 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305.
243 See IS at 1305-08.
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general prohibitions] must give way, insofar as it would pro-
hibit that which the narrow statutes would allow. 246
The dissent in the Singleton en banc decision, the same three
judges who sat on the original panel, continued to maintain that plea
agreements offering leniency for testimony are prohibited under
§ 201.247 The dissent reasoned that these agreements violated § 201's
policy of preventing inducements to provide false and misleading tes-
timony.248 The dissent stated that § 201 is applicable to federal prose-
cutors, and that the statue does not contradict subsequent congres-
sional statutes such as the Sentencing Guidelines. 249
The dissent maintained that the statutory plain meaning of the
word "whoever" as well as the statute's construction indicated the
legislature's intent to apply § 201 to the government. 2" The dissent
argued that the statute did not restrict any government prerogative. It
reasoned that § 201 did not affect the government's core prerogative
to prosecute or to withhold prosecution. "It le [ft] unfettered the sov-
ereign's established prerogative to charge; it merely place [d] a restric-
tion on one method of gathering admissible evidence." 251
In addressing whether the application of § 201 to plea agreements
contradicts subsequent statues, the dissent examined the substantial
assistance language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 (b) and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.252 It noted that neither source uses
the word "testimony" to define manners of providing substantial assis-
tance.255 The dissent conceded that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
do provide a sentence reduction for truthful testimony. 2M The dissent
noted, however, that this rule contemplates rewarding a defendant
only after the testimony is given and not offering or extending leniency
in advance of testimony as an inducement. 255
The dissent also maintained that "much of this case has been
about policy."256 They noted that their constitutional duty was to apply
the statute's plain meaning. 257 Thus, the dissenting judges said that "if
246 Id. at 1307.
247 See id. at 1308.
248 See id, at 1308-09.
249 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1312-13.
259 See id. at 1310-11.
251 Id. at 1311.
25 2 See id. at 1311-13.
253 See id, at 1312.
254 See Singleton, 165 F.5d at 1312.
255 See id at 1312-13.
256  Id. at 1309.
257 See id, at 1309-10.
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the balance struck by § 201 is to be re-weighed, that re-weighing should
be done by the policymaking branch of the government—the Con-
gress, and not the courts." 258
VII. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
While the Singleton panel decision was still awaiting an en banc
hearing before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Senator Kohl of
Vermont introduced a bill in Congress to limit the impact of its poten-
tial as precedent.259 Introduced before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on July 15, 1998, the Effective Prosecution and Public Safety
Act was aimed at preventing defendants from using § 201(c) (2) to
suppress the testimony of "government turned witnesses." 26° The bill
sought to amend 18 U.S.0 § 201 by inserting the following clause:
(a) IN GENERAL—Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, nothing in section 201 of title 18, United States Code, or
any other provision of law, shall be construed to prohibit any
otherwise lawful giving, promising, or offering by a prosecu-
tor of leniency, witness protection, or any other thing of value
258 /d. at 1310.
259 5. 2311, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). In fact, prior to the Congressional hearings on the
bill, two federal district courts in 1998 cited the Singleton three judge panel decision as authority
to exclude witness bargained testimony. See United States v. Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352 (E.D. La.
Aug. 27, 1998); United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998). In Lowery, Judge
Zloch of the Southern District of Florida excluded the testimony of three co-conspirators in a
drug case because of their plea agreement with the prosecution. See 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. Citing
the exact rationale of the Singleton court, Judge Zloch maintained that the federal prosecutor
purchased the testimony of a co-defendant through his promise of leniency. See id. at 1350-60.
He reasoned that the witness, therefore, had good reason to falsify his testimony in order to please
the prosecutor. See id. at 1359. Judge Zloch, commenting on judicial activism, stated that "if any
changes are to be made to § 201(c) (2) . . . it is solely for Congress, and not for the courts or the
Executive Branch to make them." Id. at 1360.
In Fraguela, Justice Berrigan of the Eastern District of Louisiana also followed the holding
of Singleton. See 1998 WL 560352 at *1-2. In that case, justice Berrigan granted a new trial for a
defendant who argued that several witnesses that testified against him because of the prosecu-
tion's plea agreement, violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). See id. Justice Berrigan noted "Rio find
§ 201(c) (2) inapplicable to the prosecution, just gives the prosecution yet another powerful
weapon that is not shared by the defense for no, frankly, logical reason." Id. at *2. Despite these
two courts adopting the Singleton panel rationale, federal district courts throughout the nation
have expressly rejected the Singleton panel's reasoning. See, e.g., United States v. Guillaume, 13
F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1998); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (E.D. Va.
1998); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521 (D. Md. 1998). Most of these courts
focused on the Nardone precedent and maintained that the government is presumptively exempt
from adherence to U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). See, e.g., id.
280 Klenda, Mitchell, Austermann & Zuercher LLP, Statements on S. 2311 (visited Oct. 5, 1998)
<http://www.kmazlaw.com/Publicationsistatements.html > [hereinafter Statements on S. 2311].
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within the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in
exchange for the testimony of any person, including any—
(1) offer or grant of immunity for prosecution;
(2) offer to advise a court or parole board of the extent of
the cooperation by the person with the prosecutor, or any
advice so given; or
(3) plea bargain agreement. 261
In introducing this bill, Senator Kohl stated that the Singleton
three judge panel ruling is "simply a case of Scalia-ism taken to the
extreme, beyond the bounds of common sense and in the face of
established practices. I cannot believe that even Justice Scalia, the high
priest of literalism, would agree with this result." 262 Kohl maintained
that the potential for courts to follow the Singleton panel decision is
too great for the legislature to wait for the Supreme Court to make a
decision, as "jailhouse lawyers are probably foaming at the mouth
anticipating making this argument in courts all over the nation." 265 At
the close of the 105th Congress, however, the bill remained in the
Senate Judiciary Committee and there had been no floor action taken
on the proposa1.2"
VIII. THE FUTURE OF WITNESS-BARGAINED AGREEMENTS
In analyzing the impact of Singleton, it is significant to note that
the Tenth Circuit's decision was based purely upon a federal bribery
statute and not on any constitutional provision. 25 Thus, the central
issues in this case center around: (1) whether the application of § 201
(c) (2) would either deny the U.S. government of an established pre-
rogative or operate as an obvious absurdity, and (2) whether Congress
ever intended § 201(c) (2) to apply to witness bargained agreements. 266
When closely examined, it seems clear that § 201(c) (2) does not op-
erate as an absurdity nor does it deprive the U.S. government of
an established prerogative. 267 It does, however, appear that Congress,
through various enactments including the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, intended to exclude prosecutors entering plea agreements from
261 S. 2311, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).
262 See Statements on S. 2311, supra note 260.
263 Id.
264 See Thomas, Bill Summary and Status for the 105th Congress (visited Nov. 14, 1998)
Chttp://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d105queryhtml>.
266 See 144 F.3d 1346, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en bane, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
266 See id. at 1345-48; see also Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1999).
467 See 144 F.3d at 1345-48; see also 165 F.3d at 1304-05 (Lucero, J., concurring),
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adherence to § 201(c) (2). 268 Based on this reasoning, it is likely that
the United States Supreme Court will determine that § 201(c) (2) does
not bar witness bargained plea agreements.
The Singleton case does, however, offer both Congress and the
Supreme Court the opportunity to readdress the policy issues sur-
rounding plea bargaining. 2° Recognizing the differences between the
policies the Supreme Court addressed in cases such as Brady, Santobello
and Bordenkircher, the Singleton case provides an excellent opportunity
for Congress to address several defects in the modern plea bargaining
system. Paramount among these defects are the problems associated
with broad prosecutorial discretion.
A. Government Prerogative
Under the first Nardone exemption, the U.S. government is pre-
sumptively exempt from adhering to any statute when its application
would deny the government of an established right or prerogative.")
As the Singleton panel noted, the government must satisfy two require-
ments in order to qualify for this initial exemption. 27' The first require-
ment mandates the court to determine whether the U.S. Attorney,
when acting in an official capacity, is acting as the government or
merely as the government's agent. 272 If the U.S. Attorney is found to
be an agent of the government and not the sovereign itself, then the
statute will be treated as applying to the U.S. Attorney himself. 273 As
such, the statute will not deny the government an established right and
the second requirement need not be addressed. 274
If, however, the U.S. Attorney is deemed to be the sovereign
itself, the court must move to the second requirement and determine
whether the statute denies the government of a long established pre-
rogative or right. 276 While the Singleton majority maintains that the U.S.
Attorney is for all intents and purposes the government while prose-
cuting criminal cases, 276 the dissent's opinion that the prosecution is
merely an agent or servant of the sovereign seems more logical. 277
268 The Singleton concurrence made this argument. See 165 F.3d at 1306-07.
269 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S 742 (1970); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
270 See 302 U.S. 379,383-84 (1937).
271 see singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
272 See id.
273 See id.; see also Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
274 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
279 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1300-02.
276 See id. at 1300-01; supra note 217 and accompanying text.
277 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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As the dissent argued, if federal prosecutors are held to be the
government itself rather than agents, than all other government em-
ployees representing the sovereign should also be deemed the govern-
ment itself.278 The majority maintains that it is logical to deem prose-
cutors the government since criminal prosecutions (an established
government right) can not commence unless a prosecutor is in-
volved. 279 Following this same logic, all law enforcement officers, in-
cluding the local beat cop, should be considered the government,
since the criminal law can not be enforced without their direct involve-
ment.28° If all of these officers are considered "alter egos" of the gov-
ernment, however, then where is the line of government authority to
be drawl-081 It would simply be too unwieldy to consider so many of
these individuals the government.282
Furthermore, if all of these employees are deemed the sovereign
and are therefore presumptively exempt from adhering to a statute,
the government prerogative exemption would be extremely broad,
encompassing millions of individuals across a broad spectrum of activi-
ties.283 This broad government exemption, however, is contrary to our
constitutional notions of limited government and the idea that those
who enforce the law are also subject to its rigors. 284 In order to prevent
broadening the scope of the government exemption to all these indi-
viduals, therefore, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will
determine that federal prosecutors are the government itself. Thus,
the government prerogative exemption does not exempt federal prose-
cutors from adhering to § 201(c) (2). 2"
Even if the Supreme Court were to decide that the U.S. Attorney
was the sovereign itself and not merely its agent, it seems logical that
applying § 201(c) (2) to plea negotiations would not deny any estab-
lished prerogative under the second requirement of the Nardone gov-
ernment prerogative exemption. 286 As the dissenting and concurring
justices in the Singleton appeal persuasively argue, plea bargaining is
not a long-standing government right. 287 Although the ability to prose-
2" See id.
279 See id. at 1299-1300.
288 The judges in the Singleton concurrence also made this point. See id. at 1304 (1..ticero, J.,
concurring).
281 See id. at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
282 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
288 See 165 F.311 at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
284 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
288 See 165 F.3d at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1546-.47.
288 See 165 F.3d at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1546-47.
287 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 194 F.3d at 1546-47.
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cute, or conversely not to prosecute, is an established government
practice dating back to the earliest developments of the common law,
the practice of plea bargaining was not constitutionally sanctioned
until the late 1970s. 288 The fact that the Supreme Court officially con-
demned the practice as late as the Civil War proves that, at best, plea
bargaining is a century-old concept."9 To argue otherwise would be a
distortion of constitutional history. Thus, because plea bargaining is
essentially a modern practice, it can not be an established government
right. 29°
Although it is undeniable that entering plea negotiations is a
legitimate exercise of state authority, it is by no means a vested pre-
rogative to which there are no limitations. 29 ' While the Supreme Court
in Bordenkircher sanctioned broad prosecutorial discretion in plea ne-
gotiations, the Court has not left the practice completely unregu-
lated.292 The Court has enforced some limitations on plea bargaining
including the requirement of final judicial approval on all pleas en-
tered, as well as on any sentence imposed."' Thus, the dissenting
opinion in Singleton that argues that the government right to prosecute
is conceptually different from the power to enter plea bargains seems
persuasive.294 The former is a government prerogative, while the latter
is merely a means of achieving that end."' The U.S. Attorney, there-
fore, is not exempt from adhering to § 210(c) (2). 296 To hold otherwise
and allow prosecutors to use any method, however dubious, in achiev-
ing the legitimate end of prosecuting criminals seems disjointed from
modern constitutional practice."'
288 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 751; see also Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History supra note
46, at 239-40; Langbein, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 55, at 262.
289 See Insurance Co. v. Morris, 397 U.S. 445,451 (1874).
29° See 165 F.3d at 1311-12 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
291 See FED. R. Crum. P. 35(b); Misner, supra note 104, at 754-55.
"2 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364-65 (1978); see also Fan. R. CalM. P. 35(b);
Mistier, supra note 104, at 754-55.
293 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
"4 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
298 See id.
298 See id.
291 In fact, if one closely studies late twentieth century jurisprudence in criminal procedure,
the Supreme Court has severely limited the government's ability to interrogate, induce confes-
sions and search an individual's person and property. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (holding police must inform suspects of right to silence and counsel before an
interrogation may proceed); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding custodial interro-
gation must cease once right to counsel has been invoked); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1968) (holding suspect must be advised of right to counsel before an interrogation may pro-
ceed). The Court has found these activities to be dubious means in achieving the legitimate end
of enforcing the criminal law. See id. Although the current court has made significant cutbacks
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B. Obvious Absurdity
Under the second Nardone exemption, the U.S. Attorney would
be exempt from adhering to § 201(c) (2) if the application of the
statute would operate as an obvious absurdity. As the concurring
justices in the Singleton en banc decision persuasively argued, applying
this statute to federal prosecutors entering plea agreements is far
from being absurd. While the majority infers that the historic use of
plea bargaining in criminal prosecutions makes the application of
§ 201(c) (2) absurd, they fail to develop a detailed analysis of this
statement." Although they point to a series of cases interpreting the
Singleton panel's decision,50 ' the majority does not provide any other
specific reason why applying § 201 would be absurd and merely opines
that "if Congress had intended that § 201(c) (2) overturn this in-
grained aspect of American legal culture [plea bargaining], it would
have done so in clear, unmistakable, and unarguable language. "s 02
The majority's reasoning on this point is problematic. First,
§ 201(c) (2) was enacted decades before the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of plea bargaining."' Thus, Congress was not
considering, nor did it ever envision, the implications § 201(c) (2)
would have on plea bargaining when the statute was drafted."' More
convincing, however, is the concurring opinion which maintains that
by exempting prosecutors from adherence to the statute, the court
"impl [ies] that a federal prosecutor who bribes [with monetary induce-
ments] a witness to supply false testimony is not subject to the criminal
prohibitions of § 201."m To argue that federal prosecutors who bribe
witnesses with money are exempt from adhering to § 201(c) (2) is
problematic because Congress's very intent in enacting the statute was
to root out bribery and corruption within government." Furthermore,
it is preposterous to contend that, "in the administration of the crimi-
nal law the end justifies the means."" 7 Thus, the fundamental concept
to these Warren Court innovations, it seems unlikely that they will completely overturn these
established limits of government and law enforcement authority. See id.
"8 See Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384.
299 See Singleton, 165 F.3d 1304-05 (Lucero, J., concurring).
3°I) See id. at 1301.
301 See id .
302 /d. at 1302.
t05 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 758; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2).
364 See generally S. REP. No. 2213, at 1 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3853.
305 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
306 See generally S. REP. No. 2213, at 1 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3852-53.
"7 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1347.
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of limited government, dating back to the Magna Carta, holds that
even those charged with upholding the law are subject to its rigors."'
Federal prosecutors entering plea agreements are therefore subject to
the provisions of § 201 (c) (2) and prohibited from providing induce-
ments for testimony."3 To hold otherwise is an absurdity that defies
centuries of Anglo—American jurisprudential thought. 31 °
C. Congressional Intent in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Although the two Nardane exemptions do not provide a govern-
ment exemption from adherence to § 201(c) (2), subsequent congres-
sional enactments such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal immunity statutes
provide a limited exception. 3" These laws point to a specific congres-
sional intent to override the application of § 201(c) (2) to prosecutors
entering plea agreements for testimony. 312 Simply stated, prosecutors
are no longer governed by § 201(c) (2), but rather by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
federal immunity statutes."3
It is significant to note that the general provisions of § 201(c) (2)
were written decades before the Court specifically condoned the prac-
tice of plea bargaining. 3t4 Thus, the concurring justices' statement that
"where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not
be controlled or nullified by a general one," is applicable.313 An exam-
ple of a specific statutory scheme overriding § 201(c) (2) is the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.3 '6 Section 5K1.1 of these guidelines provides
for a reduction in sentence if a defendant offers "substantial assistance"
in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has commit-
ted an offense." 7 Athough the dissenting Singleton justices contend the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not override § 201(c) (2) and that
308 See generally CoquiLLErrE, supra note 1, at 37-42; see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
" See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
31° See generally CoquiLLErrE, supra note 1, at 37-42; see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1396-97.
311 SeeFED. IL GRIM. P. 11(e); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e) (3) (1994);
18 U.S.C. § 994 (n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (a) (1994); see supra notes 39-35 and accompanying
text.
312 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e); 18 U.S.C. § 994 (n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (a) (1994); see
supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
313 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e) (3); 18 U.S.C. § 994 (n); 18 U.S.C. § 6003
(a); see also Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305-07 (Luceto, J., concurring).
314 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 742; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2)(1994).
313 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring).
316 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 51(1.1 (1994).
317 See id.
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substantial assistance can be provided in various other ways, including
only providing testimony after the entering of their own guilty plea
and not before, this argument is problematic."' First, to maintain that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines only purport to provide leniency
after a witness has entered his own guilty plea, and not before hand,
falsely assumes that agreeing to testify will not be motivated by a desire
for a decreased sentence.519 As the facts in the Singleton case illustrate,
when a criminal defendant, particularly a habitual criminal, is con-
fronted with the prospect of significant jail time, it is naive to assume
that a potential offer for a reduced sentence will not motivate his
willingness to testify, regardless of its timing.'"
Secondly, with the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines that provide a specific framework on how defendants can receive
reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony, it is unrealistic
to believe that Congress was still applying the general provisions of
§ 201(c) (2).321 Congress was obviously envisioning the practice of pro-
viding leniency for testimony when it enacted the Guidelines. Section
201(c) (2), therefore, does not prevent U.S. Attorneys from entering
these plea agreements. 322
D. Plea Bargaining Policy
Despite the improbability that the Supreme Court will overturn
the Tenth Circuit en banc decision and apply § 201(c) (2) to federal
prosecutors, the Singleton case presents an excellent opportunity for
both the Supreme Court and Congress to readdress the policy issues
surrounding plea bargaining. Based on Congressional reaction to the
Singleton three judge panel decision, the issue of bargaining for testi-
mony is obviously a topic of concern for politicians and the law en-
forcement community.'" Thus, even if the Supreme Court is unwilling
to readdress this issue, Congress should act upon Senator Kohl's Effec-
tive Prosecution and Public Safety Act and seriously consider whether
plea bargaining policies justify the granting of leniency to conspirators
willing to testify. 324
318 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1312-13 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
319 See id.
5" See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343-44.
321 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305-07 (Lucero, J., concurring); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e)(3)
(1994),
322 See id.
323 See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
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In the United States Supreme Court decisions upholding the
validity of plea bargaining, the central issue was whether the practice
of plea bargaining unconstitutionally coerced defendants into plead-
ing guilty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 525 Although in several
landmark decisions (including Miranda and Escobedo) the Court has
held that coerced confessions are constitutionally impermissible be-
cause they are inherently unreliable, the Court has refused to find
guilty pleas unreliable in the realm of plea bargaining. 326 As Brady and
its progeny illustrate, the Court has found mutual advantages in the
plea bargaining system. 927 While the judicial system benefits from
prompt case disposition, defendants are able to avoid the rigors and
uncertainties of trial and receive punishments more tailored to their
crimes. 525 As a result of these mutual advantages, the Court has held
that plea bargaining does not unconstitutionally coerce defendants
into pleading guilty. 39
In contrast, the Singleton three judge panel and dissent recognized
that witness-bargained testimony is unreliable. 55° Similar to coerced
confessions, providing leniency for testimony has the potential for
encouraging false testimony."' Motivated by a desire to avoid punish-
ment, co-conspirators have incentive to embellish stories about other
defendants in order to gain favorable prosecutorial treatment." 2 Al-
though the Court has found the unreliability argument opposing plea
bargaining unpersuasive, 533 witness-bargained agreements present a
different policy issue than those previously addressed by the Court.
When a defendant is convicted because of testimony from a witness
who has entered a plea agreement, the mutual benefits of the plea
bargaining system cease to exist for that defendant. Although the
witness who has received leniency receives a benefit from the bargain,
the defendant does not. In fact, the defendant is confronted with the
obstacle of proving his or her own innocence as well as undermining
the credibility of a witness against him or her.554 The mutual benefits
325 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 742; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357; Santobello, 404 U.S.
326 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 742; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; Escobedo, 378 U.S. 478.
327 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
328 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
223 See id.
33° See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350.
333 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1513-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350.
"2 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350.
3" See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 742; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357; Santobello, 404 U.S.
"4 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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argument that the Court has used to justify the reliability of plea
bargaining, therefore, does not apply in this context since the mutual
benefits are lost.'"
Although the judicial economy rationale for plea bargaining re-
mains valid in the leniency for testimony context," 6 the negative as-
pects of plea bargaining take on increased significance. Paramount
among these is a loss of judicial integrity.'" First, a defendant is poten-
tially exposed to false testimony that is cloaked with the power and
majesty of the U.S. government leading many jurors to presumptively
believe its validity.'" In addition, a guilty conspirator receives favorable
treatment merely because the prosecutor was able to strike a better
bargain with him or her than with the defendant. 336 In this sense, the
judicial system is reduced to a bartering system wherein whoever is
willing to confess earlier and tell the better story can purchase favor-
able treatment.34° Although critics maintain that providing leniency for
testimony has deep historical roots dating back at least to the post-Civil
War period, it is difficult to deny that the ability to purchase favorable
prosecutorial treatment runs contrary to our notions of American
justice as articulated in the Magna Carta."'
It is equally difficult to ignore, however, that many in the law
enforcement community find the ability to offer leniency for testimony
an essential tool for solving crimes."' As the Supreme Court said in
Mandujano, providing leniency for testimony is essential to the effec-
tive enforcement of various criminal statutes. 343 Presented with this
practical reality, it seems clear that the practice of bargaining for
testimony is a necessary evil in modern criminal practice. 344
Confronted with this, perhaps the best course of action Congress
can pursue in attempting to balance the realities of modern criminal
practice with the due process and fairness concerns of criminal defen-
dants is to limit prosecutorial discretion in witness-bargained agree-
335 See id.
336 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,446 (1972); see also United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564,575-76 (1976).
3" See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
33s 	 supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
m° See generally Easterbrook, supra note 117; Adelstein, supra note 119.
341 Set, Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see generally Alschuler, Plea
Bargaining History, supra note 46; Langbein, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 55; Wishingrad,
supra note 46.
342 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576.
343 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575-76.
"4 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576.
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ments.848 Although the Supreme Court has advocated broad prosecu-
torial discretion in cases like Bordenkircher, the Singleton case provides
an excellent example of a fact situation that challenges the wisdom of
broad discretion 346 Why did the U.S. Attorney choose to strike a bar-
gain with Douglas, a man with an extensive criminal background,
rather than Singleton, a woman without any previous criminal record?
In fact, Douglas had the most incentive to enter an agreement because
he was faced with the potential of significant jail time under the
habitual criminal statute."' Because of this, Douglas also had the in-
centive to embellish his story or lie about Singleton's involvement.
Although Singleton retained the right to cross-examine Douglas, once
he was cloaked with the power of the United States government,
Singleton faced an uphill battle in order to discredit Douglas' poten-
tially embellished story. 398
By limiting prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, the poten-
tial corruption and collusion from backroom deals as well as excessive
and undeserved leniency can be avoided.M 9 By simply limiting the
persons with whom prosecutors can deal and limiting the offers that
can be made, it is less likely that an innocent defendant will be con-
victed based on false testimony from a witness seeking favor with the
prosecutor.38° With clearer guidelines governing the persons with
whom prosecutors can deal, individuals such as Singleton could avoid
being unjustly convicted merely because a co-defendant wanted to
avoid extensive jail time and was, therefore, willing to give potentially
untruthful information to the prosecutor. By prohibiting prosecutors
from making deals with habitual criminals like Douglas, defendants
will have protection from those individuals who have proven their
untrustworthiness through consistent criminal behavior. 381
In addition, by limiting what prosecutors can offer for testimony,
courts can prevent undeserved offers of grossly lenient sentences to
witnesses. 352 As noted earlier, these offers for extremely lenient sen-
545 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner,
supra note 104.
346 See 434 U.S. at 357; see also Saunders, supra note 7, at 9.
347 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
548 See generally Dinell, supra note 7; Saunders, supra note 7, at 9.
349 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner,
supra note 104.
355 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Minter,
supra note 104,
351 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner,
supra note 104.
352 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner,
supra note 104.
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tences provide a tremendous incentive to provide false and damaging
testimony.'" If prosecutors were given guidelines, similar to the current
Sentencing Guidelines, detailing the lowest sentence that can be of-
fered for a given crime, courts could insure that witnesses do not
receive excessive and undeserved leniency as a result of striking a
bargain with the prosecutor. 3" At the same time, defendants would
have increased protection from potentially false or misleading testi-
mony.
CONCLUSION
Although the initial Singleton three judge panel decision sent
shock waves throughout the legal community, the Tenth Circuit's en
banc reversal has calmed many critics' fears. While it is questionable
whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, the policy questions
which the case has brought to the surface have shed a different light
on the academic debate surrounding plea bargaining. The Singleton
three judge panel has forced many attorneys to examine whether, in
fact, the practice of providing leniency for testimony is bribery in
violation of § 201(c) (2). 3"
The Singleton en banc majority's ruling that prosecutors entering
plea agreements are presumptively exempt from adhering to
§ 201(c) (2) because the statute denies the government an established
right, however, evidences the Tenth Circuits' opinion that the practice
is not government sanctioned bribery. 356 Although the majority's appli-
cation of the government prerogative exemption and its holding that
prosecutors are exempt from adhering to § 201 (c) (2) may be incor-
rect, the concurring judges' opinion that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines clearly and spe-
cifically sanction the practice of providing leniency for testimony seems
accurate.357 As the concurring judges recognize, Congress has ex-
pressed a specific intent to permit witness bargained agreements and,
therefore, U.S. Attorneys are exempted from adhering to
§ 201 (c) (2). 358
353 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gifford, supra note 123; Mistier,
supra note 104; see also supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
354 See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner,
supra note 104.
355 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1361.
355 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301-02.
3" See id. at 1305-07 (Luccro, J., concurring).
358 See id.
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Despite these specific congressional enactments that seem to
trump the general provisions of § 201(c) (2), one cannot deny that the
practice of witness plea bargaining presents distinct policy issues from
those the Court has discussed in Brady and its progeny. 359 Although the
judicial efficiency arguments and the realities of criminal practice
suggest a legitimate practical need for witness-bargained testimony, the
mutuality of benefits rationale for plea bargaining lacks merit for
defendants convicted because of witness-bargained testimony. 36° As dis-
cussed earlier, a defendant convicted as a result of witness-bargained
testimony does not receive a benefit, but rather is confronted with
potentially false and damaging testimony.36'
Recognizing this, the Court must confront a new dilemma—do
the merits of judicial efficiency and economy outweigh the fairness
arguments of those who are convicted through the use of bargained
testimony? For now, the Tenth Circuit has answered this question in
the affirmative.362 Perhaps the time has come to reassess both the
scholarly debate concerning the benefits of plea bargaining in the
realm of witness-bargained agreements and the alternatives that have
been suggested including the limitation of prosecutorial discretion in
plea bargaining. 363 Unless the Supreme Court or Congress takes further
action on this issue, however, the Singletan panel's "warning shot" that
was originally heralded as the beginning of the end of plea bargaining
remains nothing more than a false alarm.
JAMES P. DOWDEN
339 	 supra notes 323-51 and accompanying text.
36° See supra notes 336--41 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 325-48 and accompanying text.
362 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1302.
363 Numerous scholars have proposed alternatives to plea bargaining. For some interesting
viewpoints, see Alschuler, Alternatives, supra note 123; Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123
at 50; Atenella, supra note 107; Gilford, supra note 123, at 37; White, supra note 107.
